Capacity i n
processing and advanced processing industries, while the three other indexes are available for finer industry breakdowns, generally at the standard industrial classification two-digit industry level. The main purpose of this paper is to examine these four measures.
For a limited number of industries, trade associations compile further information on capacity. Reoently such data have been combined by the Federal Reserve into an index of "capacity utilization in major materials industries."' The index is a potentially useful addition to the available information about capacity and deserves scrutiny by the profession. However, it covers only a small fraction of all manufacturing and is not publicly available for the individual industries from which it is derived. Thus, it cannot be easily evaluated or used to check the more comprehensive indexes just described, although some casual comparisons are reported below.
Finally, numerous attempts have been made to build up properly weighted series on capital stocks to serve in much the same way as capacity measures in economic analysis.2 In fact, capital stocks are employed in one part of the procedure for developing the Federal Reserve Board capacity index. However, no measure of capacity or operating rates generated entirely from capital stock estimates has come into widespread use and none is evaluated here.
Recent Developments
An unusual amount of attention has centered on operating rates during the expansion of 1971-73, particularly since the outburst of inflation in 1973. In the six quarters following the introduction of the new economic program in 1971, real gross national product grew at an average annual rate of 7.2 percent. Real growth exceeded an 8 percent rate in the last quarter of 1972 and the first quarter of 1973. This extremely rapid expansion led many observers to argue that the economy was stretching its available pro-fining its concept of capacity. Plainly, all of them refer to a reasonably "normal" form of operation: They do not measure what could be produced by a fully war-mobilized economy. Nor can they measure what limits to total production might arise from serious bottlenecks in one or more key industries. The emerging fuel shortage threatens to limit total output in a way that could not be measured by any capacity index. There is some evidence that the measures refer to production near a minimum average cost point on a cost curve.4 In the absence of a more precise definition, the saving feature of any of the present capacity and utilization indexes must be the assumption (warranted, one hopes) that the index is consistent through time so that at least it is always measuring the same-if unspecified-concept. The usefulness of the measure can then emerge in its ability to predict.
The available indexes of manufacturing capacity are based on distinctly different approaches to measurement. McGraw-Hill surveys firms directly about their capacity and operating rates. The Wharton analysts estimate capacity by looking directly at the amount produced. The Federal Reserve Board combines information from the McGraw-Hill surveys with heroic assumptions about the relation between capital stock estimates and capacity. The way each of the measures is formally constructed can be briefly described. them directly comparable with government statistics for each industry. To obtain more aggregated estimates, individual industries are combined using weights from the index of industrial production.6
MCGRAW-HILL SURVEYS
McGraw-Hill does not define capacity or operating rates, and firms respond according to their own definitions. Firms also indicate what their "preferred operating rates" are, and again McGraw-Hill does not attempt to define the concept. The capacity survey asks firms about both their plans for additions to capacity in the current year and their actual additions in the previous year. The analysis in this paper is based on the actual additions to capacity that firms have reported.
The McGraw-Hill series on additions to capacity and on operating rates are separate and independent from one another. The level of capacity indicated by the one cannot be divided into a measure of output for the industry to obtain the operating rate provided by the other. The survey on operating rates refers to December of each year and in the present analysis is treated as an average operating rate for the entire month. Thus, when divided into seasonally adjusted output for December as measured by the Federal Reserve Board's index of industrial production, this series yields an estimate of capacity for that month.
The McGraw-Hill capacity survey is not benchmarked to a level of utilization rates. Capacity in each industry is an index number equal to 100 in 1967. Dividing this index into output yields a utilization index. In the present analysis, this utilization index for each industry was then scaled so that its average over the entire data period equaled the average rate from the McGraw-Hill utilization survey for the corresponding industry.
Both of the McGraw-Hill measures are subject to the normal technical problems of survey sampling. By the nature of what they measure, they can also be suspected of having certain distinctive strengths and weaknesses. Estimates from the capacity survey suffer from having no periodic benchmark, so that any systematic error in the annual estimates of capacity growth will cumulate. By contrast, errors in estimates of capacity growth from the operating rate survey are unlikely to cumulate since new operating rate benchmarks are provided annually. This survey, however, could suffer from a cyclical bias if respondents treated marginal facilities differently at 6. Aggregation should be made using capacity weights rather than output weights. However, all the measures reviewed have used some form of output or value-added weighting and the error in doing so is probably small. different stages of the cycle, say, by ignoring some idle facilities in estimating operating rates during slack periods but counting them when they were put back into use.
FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD INDEX
The Federal Reserve Board index of manufacturing capacity is the most eclectic of the indexes in construction, relying on three distinct sources of information. The data from these sources are combined in a way that aims to utilize the best features of each set and minimize its weaknesses. The FRB methodology relies on the McGraw-Hill utilization rate survey to benchmark its capacity index over the longer run. However, to estimate year-to-year changes in capacity, it uses two indicators of short-term capacity growth: year-to-year changes in the McGraw-Hill capacity survey and estimates of the size of the capital stock. The FRB index merges these three kinds of information on capacity growth by estimating the historic relationship between the two short-run indicators and the utilization rate survey.
The historic drift in capacity between the two McGraw-Hill surveys is estimated by time trends. The time trend for the latest interval is then applied to the estimates from the capacity survey to provide one estimate of yearly capacity growth. The same procedure is used to establish the time trend of the drift between the capital stock and capacity calculated from the utilization survey. This time trend is then applied to the annual growth of the capital stock to provide a second estimate of capacity growth year by year. These two estimates of yearly capacity growth-one from the driftadjusted capacity survey and one from the drift-adjusted capital stock-are then averaged to provide the final FRB capacity index. Quarterly estimates are interpolated from yearly estimates; and quarterly estimates of capacity utilization are derived by dividing capacity into the FRB industrial production index.7
A serious weakness of the FRB index is that the benchmarking to the utilization survey is based on historic statistical relationships that are simple at best and that may change substantially. In particular, estimates for recent years are based on simple time trend estimates of the drift that are heavily weighted with historical information. The estimates are not currently updated;8 and even if they were, they would still not adequately reflect any abrupt recent changes in the relation of investment and capital stock to capacity or in the bias in the McGraw-Hill capacity series.
THE WHARTON INDEX
The Wharton measure of capacity is produced by an extremely simple procedure. Seasonally adjusted quarterly data on output for each of the two-digit manufacturing industries are recorded to determine peak quarters of output, and output at the peaks are taken as measures of capacity in each industry. Between successive peaks, capacity is assumed to grow along a straight-line path connecting them. For the period after the most recent peak, capacity is assumed to grow along the same straight line that it followed before that peak. If output subsequently goes above this line, a new capacity estimate is defined by that level of output, and a final estimate is established when output eventually turns down. Thus at no time does utilization exceed 100, and it reaches 100 at every cyclical peak. Some exceptional cases are dealt with separately, such as a peak followed by a brief decline and a return of output to new highs, or a declining industry whose output achieves local peaks that lie below previous peaks. In arriving at a capacity measure for all manufacturing, individual industries are aggregated using value-added weights.
On one occasion, Klein and Preston checked the estimates of capacity based on the basic Wharton methodology by comparing them with estimates from a production function for several individual industries.9 In light of evidence that some of the basic Wharton series were drifting away from the production function estimates, the Wharton index was adjusted upward through 1960. Wharton capacity estimates for later years have been made with the basic methodology.'0
The obvious drawback to the Wharton methodology is its treatment of 10. The basic methodology is not considered sacred and apparently some of the estimates have occasionally been amended. However, the index is constructed essentially as described here. every peak in output as a point of "full utilization." The criticism that the 1959-60 output peak clearly should not have been regarded as a point of full utilization spurred the adjustment to the series just described. And in their analysis, Klein and Preston concluded that the adjustment was required because the output peaks in the early 1950s represented overutilization for purposes of the Wharton index as well as because the 1959-60 peaks were periods of less than full utilization.1' Since, for individual industries, operating rates at peaks are defined to be 100, the basic Wharton methodology cannot distinguish differences in the intensity of utilization from one peak to another. The peak operating rate for all manufacturing or some other aggregation will be less than 100 since all industries do not peak in the same quarter. Thus peak operating rates for manufacturing can differ from cycle to cycle because of differences in the distribution of individual industry peaks in time, but not because the intensity of utilization at those industry peaks is measured to be different.
Because the most recent estimate of capacity in the Wharton methodology is provisional until a peak in output is reached, another drawback of the Wharton methodology is that current estimates of capacity and operating rates are always subject to revision depending on the course of output. If output exceeds the capacity line extrapolated from the most recent peak, capacity will be defined to coincide with output until output slows and a new peak is established to define capacity for the present cycle. Retrospectively, operating rates initially reported as 100 may be revised downward substantially. Conversely, if output expands weakly and peaks before reaching the capacity line that had been extrapolated from the most recent peak, initially reported operating rates will be revised upward. Quarters in which spare capacity was initially reported to have been ample will historically be shown to have been periods of full utilization. Thus the Wharton index can tell different stories to the researcher using it historically and to the decision maker using it currently.
The simplicity of the Wharton methodology is also its great strength. The technique is easily applied and yields prompt estimates of capacity utilization over a wide range of industries. In recent years, it has been applied to data on industrial production in many countries other than the United States to produce historic and current estimates of utilization. While its drawbacks are unmistakable, the Wharton index may serve very well where a measure of changes in utilization rates over relatively short time intervals is useful.
Characteristics of the Measures
Several characteristics of these four measures of manufacturing capacity and utilization can be examined by comparing their past behavior. Some of the findings from this examination are suggested by the descriptions of how the several measures are constructed and how they have been utilized in the past. But there are also a few surprises. Table 1 The principal result of interest is the significant positive relationship between output changes and changes in capacity as measured by the McGrawHill utilization survey. The estimated effect is virtually identical in both regression periods. There is no important relation between current output and current capacity for any of the other measures. Since output enters without a lag, and since variation in the capital stock should capture much of the true variation in capacity, it is extremely doubtful that this relation between output and capacity represents a genuine case of rising output inducing capacity growth. Rather, capacity as measured from the utilization survey does seem to have a cyclical bias. It appears that respondents "find" capacity when output rises sharply, and "lose" it when output slackens.
CYCLICAL BIAS
It is not clear whether the results reflect simply a bias of respondents to the survey, or the thinking of management about how much capacity is actually available. If they reflect the thinking of decision makers, then a reported utilization rate that subsequently proved to be too high when out-put expanded and new capacity was "discovered" could still produce the economic consequences of tight capacity. The index with cyclical bias could predict well. Indeed, since most economic developments one would forecast using utilization rates are just as cyclical as the bias in the index is, predictions could be expected to be little affected by the bias, whatever its source.
The estimated elasticity between output and capacity measured by the utilization survey is about one-quarter. Thus, assuming any given actual growth in capacity, if output were to grow 8 percent rather than zero in a given year, the utilization survey would indicate a 2 percent difference in capacity growth and a corresponding two-point narrower spread in utilization rates than actually would characterize the two alternative output paths. For individual years, there is some evidence that the bias may have been noticeably larger: in 1966, the survey indicated a growth in capacity of more than 10 percent, and in 1970, a growth of only 0.3 percent. If, as seems reasonable, capacity is interpreted as the quantities that firms find they can produce when actually put to the test, the utilization survey estimates are most reliable at high levels of utilization, and comparisons with other indexes are best made for such periods.
This finding also validates the use of the utilization survey to benchmark information about capacity levels in the FRB index while other measures are used to estimate year-to-year changes in the index. However, the FRB methodology of estimating time trends among the different measures may not be optimal, since for relatively short time intervals, a trend estimate can be too much influenced by a few observations. It might be better to benchmark to estimates from the utilization survey at its latest peak. Even better might be adjustment of the capacity implied by the utilization survey with an equation such as that in Table 1 and application of the adjusted estimate to correct the drift in the other inputs of the FRB index.
The other result of interest in Table 1 is the change in the relation of capital stock growth to capacity growth between the two periods for the utilization survey index and the Wharton index. The relation is little changed between the two periods for the other capacity indexes. Since some drift is expected between measures of capital stock growth and capacity, and the timing between the two is not known accurately, no great significance is attached to the differences in coefficients among the measures. But the decline in the estimated elasticity between periods in two of the measures does correspond to the hypothesis that pollution control efforts, and possibly other developments, have reduced the annual increment to capacity that goes along with a given level of investment spending. The size of the effect is substantial. According to the estimates for the utilization survey index, to achieve a given percentage increase in capacity now requires 25 percent faster growth in the capital stock-roughly equivalent to 10 percent more gross investment-than it used to. The effect estimated for the Wharton index is even greater.
GROWTH IN CAPACITY
In Table 2 The average relation between the two measures through the mid-1960s is appropriate for comparing the indexes. The Wharton index was examined and revised at about that time.14 Furthermore, the recent and current evidence on operating rates is best examined using evidence about the relation between the two measures established from previous years. However, even if the ratio of the two measures up to 1972-96.7-were used to make them comparable, such a procedure would still imply a much smaller adjustment than adjusting by the preferred rate reported by McGraw-Hill, which was 93 in 1972 for all manufacturing.
An examination of individual industries reported in both surveys supports the conclusion that no level adjustment is required between the two. By 1968, when the average ratio over the 1954-68 period was still 98.3 percent in all manufacturing, the 1954-68 average McGraw-Hill operating rate exceeded the average Wharton operating rate over the same period in five of the eleven individual industries. Thus there is simply no evidence that over most of the history of the two surveys the levels of operating rates they report should not be compared directly, either at the all-manufacturing level or at some level of disaggregation. Adjusting the McGraw-Hill index by its preferred operating rate would bring operating rates in the two measures closer together for the most recent years, but only at the expense of moving them further apart in earlier periods.
OPERATING RATE CORRELATIONS
Despite the differences among the four measures already cited, their measures of operating rates are highly correlated, even over the whole 1954-72 period. The correlation of the Wharton index with the others is clearly the weakest. But as the marked divergence of the Wharton index from the others occurs rather abruptly in the mid-1960s, the Wharton correlations are much higher if the whole period is divided into two parts. When the period is separated into intervals covering fourth quarter 1954 to fourth quarter 1965 and first quarter 1966 to fourth quarter 1972, the Wharton correlations rise substantially and become virtually indistinguishable from the correlations among the other measures. These correlations are presented in Table 3 .
Correlating operating rates is a weak test of the similarity of the indexes 14. Klein and Preston, "Some New Results." since all four measures have industrial production as a common numerator. The correlations do show that despite their differences, all four are likely to be useful for many purposes. At a minimum, they must all gauge cyclical variations with some success, measuring differences between years of high and low utilization that follow one another fairly closely. Since the measures have been shown to drift substantially apart over time, however, they cannot be comparably successful in answering harder questions, such as whether operating rates in 1972 were already near peak levels.
Recent Hazards for Estimating Capacity
Much of the preceding analysis points up the fact that alternative capacity estimates have been agreeing less with one another since the mid-1960s than they used to. Coinciding with this development are several occurrences in the economy that may have posed special difficulties for capacity measurements. Two of these, about which only a little can be said here, are the acceleration of wages and the striking changes in competitiveness between the United States and other nations.
The acceleration in wages of the late 1960s and 1970s is sometimes thought to have spurred more capital-intensive production techniques and hence to have altered the relation between the capital stock and capacity. If the prices of capital goods reflect actual wage levels-which they probably do-and if costs of financial capital reflect expected wage increaseswhich is much less certain-no shifts in production techniques would be predicted simply from the onset of inflation. It is beyond the present analysis to judge whether in the real world of recent years, inflation in fact affected production techniques and capacity growth.
Changes in international competitiveness have been striking and could well have affected economic capacity in U.S. industries. A concentrated oligopolistic industry such as steel has been subjected to competitive pressure from imports produced by technically more advanced facilities abroad. Modernization of the U.S. facilities also may have been profitable for some time; but they were not treated as obsolete until foreign competition intruded. More generally, the inroads of foreign competition in particular lines can make U.S. capacity obsolete even in competitive sectors. But as pervasive as such a development may appear to be, if the newest technology is available to U.S. producers, the presence of foreign competition itself is not the key to accelerated obsolescence. The key is a slower rise in unit labor costs abroad than here because of greater moderation of wages relative to productivity growth. The importance of this factor cannot be analyzed further here, and it is hard even to speculate about which of the available measures of capacity might most successfully detect obsolescence from this source.
THE ANTIPOLLUTION DRIVE
Somewhat more can be said about a third development in the economy over this recent period that may have posed special difficulties for some ways of measuring capacity: the intensified drive to reduce environmental pollution from industrial sources.
In recent years, a great deal of public attention has been focused on the problems of polluted air and water. Industry has been identified as a major source of pollution and has been the object of intensified antipollution efforts. These efforts have the effect of altering historically estimated measures of the capital stock and industrial capacity at both ends of the productive life of fixed capital: To the extent that some portion of current investment expenditures are made for the purpose of cleaning up production processes, investment will add less to capacity than it has added historically, and less to the capital stock conceived as a means of augmenting production. And to the extent that some facilities are abandoned ahead of schedule because they cannot economically be altered to conform to new environmental standards, the capital stock and capacity are reduced by retirement more quickly than historical experience would predict.
Since 1967 By the end of 1972, according to these calculations, the portion of the FRB capacity measure that is generated using investment and capital stock estimates was 3.3 percent too high in the primary processing industries and 1.5 percent too high in the advanced processing industries. Since the FRB capacity estimates use the McGraw-Hill capacity survey together with these capital stock estimates, the actual FRB capacity index would be off by only half these amounts on the basis of this one adjustment. And if some part of the outlays identified with pollution abatement also add to 15. "Business' Plans for Plant and Equipment, 1972-75." capacity, the importance of this adjustment for the aggregates that the FRB uses must be regarded as small. For individual industries, the effect could be considerably larger. But if the pollution control movement has had an important effect on industrial capacity over a range of industries, it must have come by the other route-by forcing early retirement of existing facilities.
There are no direct measures of the retirement or obsolescence of capital facilities. Historical estimates are available on average lives of various types of capital and these are used in empirical investigations such as the FRB capacity index. But they offer no warning of changes in typical historical patterns. In principle, some of the capacity estimates that are under review would be capable of detecting such changes. If output peaks were always caused by capacity limitations, the Wharton methodology would detect them along with other influences on capacity growth. The half of the FRB capacity measure that rests on a historical relation between capital stock and capacity could not detect such a change. And one can only hypothesize that respondents to the McGraw-Hill surveys take proper account of this source of change in their capacity. It could be that the capacity survey detects the capacity enlargement arising from new investment more accurately than it does the subtractions due to retirements or obsolescence. The former involves money-capital budgeting, contracting, and spending-while the latter does not. There is no comparable reason to believe that the operating rate survey is biased in its allowance for retirements and obsolescence since it represents, ideally at least, a fresh assessment each year of the utilization of available capacity.
The capacity growth rates displayed in Table 2 are consistent with these hypotheses about retirements and obsolescence: that they were unusually heavy during this period and that the utilization survey detected this fact while the capacity survey failed to do so. The utilization survey recorded a sharp slowdown in capacity growth after the mid-1960s, while the capacity survey reflected only a slight slowdown and recorded a capacity growth rate twice as large as the utilization survey during the 1969-72 interval.
Disaggregating Measures of Capacity
As the overall level of business activity varies, capacity pressures are not even among individual industries. While some industries show more pro-nounced cyclical variation in output than others, their tendency to do so is not strong enough to ensure regularity in capacity pressure across industries from one cycle to another. Aggregate measures of capacity utilization, such as the widely reported measures of operating rates in all manufacturing, thus conceal a great deal of irregularity in the position of individual industries. Yet it may make quite a lot of difference if the average operating rate for all manufacturing is a couple of points below full utilization because most manufacturing industries are in that position rather than because some industries are operating at the limits of their capacity while others suffer an overhang of idle facilities. In the 1973 economy, information from a variety of sources indicates that capacity limited the expansion of output in several industries such as paper, petroleum, steel, and some lines of chemicals, while many others exhibited evidence of ample spare capacity.
The significance of measures of capacity and of capacity utilization will vary from industry to industry. Prices can be expected to be more sensitive to the degree of utilization in some industries than in others. In sufficiently concentrated industries, where firms aim for a target rate of return, prices may even have a negative relation to utilization, rising when utilization, productivity, and profits are low. Similarly, the significance of utilization rates for explaining investment will differ among industries. In some industries, capacity represents a true physical limit to production. Those employing continuous process operations, such as petroleum and paper, typically use facilities as intensively as demand permits, running them nearly twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. When all facilities are running at these rates, a meaningful physical limit to capacity is reached. Average cost curves may be flat or declining right up to this point in such operations. By contrast, in others, such as the automobile industry, production is geared to a typical workweek but is easily expanded by running production lines more days or longer hours each day. The average labor cost of doing so is higher, at least after a point, because of overtime pay. But other costs are spread more widely. It may be profitable to expand output very substantially beyond the normal operating level, with cost curves flat or declining well past what is customarily regarded as 100 percent of capacity. The implications, both for new investment and for price pressures, are thus widely different for petroleum refining and for automobile production.
Disaggregating the available measures of manufacturing capacity per- 
Predicting Capacity Growth
High operating rates should, other things equal, induce firms to add to their capacity. A natural test of the indexes under review, therefore, is their ability to predict their own capacity growth rates from their own past utilization rates. How the three measures under review fared in such a test is reported in Table 4 . The percentage increase in capacity for each measure was explained by past values of its own operating rates and past increases in output. Output change is included as a way of capturing the effect of expected future changes in output on capacity decisions. The exact form of the equation used is shown in Table 4 . The table presents the t-ratios of the operating rate variable in the equation explaining capacity growth for each of fourteen industries as well as for all manufacturing.
Both McGraw-Hill measures explain themselves well. The capacity survey measure registers a wrong sign in only one of the fourteen industries, food, and has a t-ratio lower than 2.0 in three others. The utilization survey measure does about as well. It has wrong signs in two industries and t-ratios lower than 2.0 in only one other. Both of these measures also perform well in explaining their own estimates of capacity growth in all manufacturing. The Wharton index fails in almost every industry. Only in textiles does its own estimate of operating rates succeed in explaining its estimate of capacity growth. Its operating rate variable has the wrong sign in nine other industries and t-ratios less than 2.0 in the remaining three industries. It also has a negligible coefficient in its equation for all manufacturing.
Predicting Investment
For GNP forecasting, the analyst is primarily interested in predicting investment spending rather than capacity growth. While the expected causal relation between operating rates and investment is less precise than the relation between operating rates and capacity growth that was just analyzed, investment is, in most instances, the primary action that firms can take to expand capacity. In practice, operating rates are commonly used by forecasters to help explain investment, and the ability of such an index to do so is an important test of its general usefulness.
How the three indexes fared in explaining investment is shown in Table 5 , which displays t-ratios for their operating rates in an investment equation for twelve industries as well as for all manufacturing. The equation explained the ratio of deflated investment to output by past values of operating rates. Capital stocks for individual industries were not available, so it was not possible to try to explain investment as a fraction of the capital stock. The exact form of the estimating equation is given in the table. Table 6 , where the coefficients and t-statistics for the operating rate terms are compared in equations for twelve separate industries.
All the price equations were estimated for periods ending in the second quarter of 1971. Data were available to start the estimation period, with three-quarter lags, in the third quarter of 1955. Ending the estimation period in mid-1971 avoided the Phase I, II, and III price control episodes. Since there is no way to know the effect of controls on prices in individual industries during this era of abruptly changing wage-price policies, estimates of normal effects would be distorted. A utilization index that was "too low" during the initial freeze and Phase II would predict prices better than it should in that period. An index that was "too high" might do better than it should during the Phase III stage of suddenly absent controls. Confining the estimation to the years before Phase I avoids making special allowances in the equations for all these changes. During the wage-price guidepost period of 1962-68, restraints were much milder and, on the evidence as I interpret it, acted mainly by moderating wage increases and keeping prices in step with wages. Since cost changes are accounted for in the price equations estimated here, little room remains for a separate guidepost effect. In a few industries some effect may have been felt, particularly in 1968, but no attempt was made to allow for it.
For each industry, basic price equations were estimated explaining the change in the price of the industry's output by the level of capacity utilization, the change in the average wage in the industry (measured by straighttime hourly earnings of production workers), and the change in the price of the industry's material inputs. In two cases, data on wages or materials prices were not available. And in some others, one or both took on the wrong sign and the equation was reestimated without them. The three change variables had the form, xt/ (0.4xt-, + 0.3xt-2 + 0.2xt-3 + O.1Xt-4) .
When the variable is changing at a steady rate, this can be thought of as approximately 1 + 1/2 (annual rate of increase). Thus the coefficient on the utilization rate in this equation can be thought of as approximately onehalf the elasticity of the variable with respect to the utilization rate, although the precise lag structure is rather complicated.
In addition to the industries for which statistics are reported in Table 6 , it was possible to estimate price equations for six other two-digit industries -tobacco, apparel, lumber, furniture, leather, and fabricated metalsusing just Wharton utilization data. Judged by t-statistics greater than 2.0, utilization rates were successful variables in all cases but apparel.
Besides the equation set forth in Table 6 , two alternative forms of price equations were estimated for each of the industries. Since the level of utilization rates is used in the Table 6 equations, the estimates imply that in a steady state in which the utilization rate was unchanged, the rate of price increase would be unchanged. Since the rates of change of input prices and of wages in the industry are measured separately by the other explanatory variables in the equation, this implication is implausible. One should not expect margins to keep expanding or contracting indefinitely. Of course, one would not expect such a steady state to prevail. Expanding margins would be expected to induce firms to expand capacity faster, thereby reducing operating rates. The equations reported in Table 6 are too simple to capture all such effects. One might want to look for an independent effect on prices from changes in utilization rather than from its level. Quite apart from this argument, in industries whose pricing is characterized by market-clearing behavior, one would expect the change in utilization, rather than its level, to explain price movements.
Equations including the change in utilization were estimated for each industry and with each measure of utilization. Of the industries shown in Table 6 , this variation was successful in textiles and petroleum; it also succeeded in the lumber and leather industries, for which only Wharton utilization data were available.
Alternative equations were also estimated using a nonlinear form of the utilization rate, 1/(1.2 -U) , where the U term was a distributed lag as before. In the denominator of this expression, 1.2 is used to avoid too much nonlinearity and the explosion of the term to infinity as utilization rates occasionally reached 1.0. It seems likely that utilization effects on prices are nonlinear, but these equations were virtually indistinguishable from those reported in Table 6 .
The coefficients for two industries deserve special comment. Utilization had a significant negative effect on prices for motor vehicles, using all three measures, and for tobacco, for which only a Wharton estimate is available. It seems sensible to interpret this result as evidence of pricing based on a target rate of return in these industries.16 It is much less likely that the significant negative coefficient on food estimated using the McGraw-Hill capacity survey can be interpreted in this way, since this industry is not as concentrated as autos and tobacco. While the equation reported in Table 6 cannot be considered an optimal pricing equation, it does seem to capture the importance of utilization rates once costs have been accounted for, and does provide a fairly straightforward comparison of the utilization rate measures. On the basis of these results, a price forecaster would want to pick and choose among the alternative measures of utilization. No doubt, the results for any one index or for any one industry could be improved with a more elaborate specification of the price equation. But even with the simple form used here, all three of the measures do well enough to be taken seriously.
Why does the Wharton index do as well as any in explaining prices when it failed in explaining capacity growth and was not quite up to its competitors in explaining investment? An explanation seems to lie in the fact that most of the price increase in the period 1954:4 through 1971:2 occurred during the years 1966-71. As Table 3 showed, manufacturing operating rates by all four measures are highly correlated with each other in this interval. Wharton's jump to a new plateau of operating rates relative to the 16. Richard Benson of Harvard University, who estimated some of the price equations for this paper, also reports this result for autos and tobacco in equations that include profit rates as explanatory variables for prices. These cases, and a few others that are not so conspicuous, cast doubt on the reliability of the capacity survey for measuring the level of utilization despite its usefulness for other purposes. It is significant that two principal users of this survey benchmark it periodically to utilization rates from the McGraw-Hill utilization survey. As noted earlier, the FRB capacity index is constructed (in part) by adjusting the capacity survey to match the trend of capacity growth implied in the utilization survey. McGraw-Hill itself derives a special series of monthly utilization rates by a method that links capacity growth estimates from the capacity survey to utilization rates from the utilization survey.17 The particular way in which these estimates are linked does not equate utilization from the two sources every year; but it keeps the capacity survey estimate from wandering very far over any period of time.
The equation results reported in Tables 4, 5 , and 6 show that operating rates from the capacity survey can be useful predictors. In such equations, exponential drifts in the operating rate index can be compensated for in the estimated constant term of the regression. But the level of operating rates derived from this survey cannot be relied on for assessing the current situation.
That leaves the Wharton index and the McGraw-Hill utilization survey. Table 7 compares operating rates recorded by these two measures for individual industries. It shows the peak rates achieved during the first half of 1973 and the difference between these rates and the peaks achieved in the 1968-69 and 1966 expansionary periods.
WHARTON
As a result of the considerable rise in production that had occurred through mid-1973, most industries in the Wharton measure showed operating rates at 100 at that time. It would be comforting to believe in such an apparently well-balanced expansion, but no other evidence supports such a view. The table also shows that by Wharton data, operating rates in 1973 have been above 1966 peaks in most industries. Yet there is widespread agreement that capacity was being utilized very intensely in most industries during at least part of 1966.18 These facts, revealed in Table 7 , reflect the two basic weaknesses of the Wharton methodology: its inability to distinguish any difference in the intensity of utilization achieved at different cyclical peaks; and its need to wait on a subsequent peak before settling on what operating rates have been-even by its own definitionsduring an expansion. If the present expansion were to continue at an aboveaverage pace for some time, the current capacity estimates in the Wharton index would be revised upward and the estimates of recent operating rates would be reduced.
MCGRAW-HILL UTILIZATION
All in all, the McGraw-Hill utilization survey seems the most believable of the available measures. Unlike the capacity survey, it can be expected to be reasonably free of drift over time. A priori, one would expect that changes in obsolescence of facilities, in their capital-labor ratios, or in other characteristics of production techniques should be accounted for by 18 . This is true even though cyclical peaks were not recorded in every industry that year; otherwise Table 7 
Price-Sensitive Operating Rates
In late 1972 and in 1973 a particular need arose for a measure that would answer the questions of whether capacity utilization pressures were causing inflation, and if so, where. For this purpose, the results here show that a measure of utilization in all manufacturing was not very useful. Price equations indicated that utilization rates matter far more for predicting prices in some industries than in others. The analyst can work directly with individual equations for individual industries to predict price effects. But a summary index can convey the general picture of tightness or slack that exists, and one can be constructed using the information from the individ-ual industry equations summarized in Table 6 . Such an index is formed by weighting the utilization rate for each industry by the relative importance of output in that industry and the coefficient in the price equation for that industry.
Three such indexes of operating rates in price-sensitive industries are shown in Table 8 . The three indexes arise from using the McGraw-Hill utilization index alone, the Wharton index alone, and a mixture of the two. For reasons already given, the McGraw-Hill utilization index is preferred for comparing operating rates at successive cyclical peaks. However, this index is not available separately for several important industries and the Wharton index did outperform McGraw-Hill in the price equations in a few industries for which both were available. Thus data from both are used in the Table 8 Table 6 . By restricting the index to nonfood industries, I avoided the uncertainty about an equation for food. And I omitted the motor vehicles industry, with its significant negative coefficient, on the grounds that the index is designed not to forecast average price changes, which would call for including negative as well as positive effects of utilization, but rather to indicate roughly the upward price pressures arising from high operating rates. Table 8 The source of this discrepancy in the indexes of Table 9 is difficult to identify. The FRB special is of unknown quality. Analysts could evaluate it more easily if data for its constituent industries were available separately. The index based on McGraw-Hill data has substantially different coverage. Its reading of present utilization rates is not inconsistent with the possibility that significant bottlenecks exist in some parts of the industries that it does include. The ambiguous results of Table 9 reemphasize the need for more disaggregation in reliable measures of utilization. But detecting bottlenecks can probably never be accomplished by looking at capacity utilization measures. Bottlenecks can occur in too many places and at too detailed an industry level. And they can arise from raw materials bottlenecks more readily than from shortages of manufacturing capacity.
Advanced and Primary Processing Industries
A special feature of the Federal Reserve's regular index is its disaggregation into primary and advanced processing industries. This feature has attracted attention because, after reaching comparable levels at their 1966 and 1969 peaks, operating rates in these two categories diverged sharply in recent years. By the end of 1972, the moderate operating rates recorded in the FRB all-manufacturing index represented an average of exceptionally low rates in advanced processing industries and rates near the 1969 peaks in primary processing industries. This divergence continued through the second quarter of 1973 in the FRB index.
In Table 10 , the McGraw-Hill utilization rates are used to construct indexes comparable to the FRB measures for advanced and primary processing industries. These show a rather surprising disagreement with the FRB index. By the second quarter of 1973, operating rates in advanced processing industries were at levels similar to the 1966 peaks as measured by McGraw-Hill rather than at the recession levels indicated by the FRB index. For primary processing industries, the measure based on McGrawHill data shows somewhat lower operating rates in 1973 than the FRB index, but the disagreement is not great. And since the lumber and steel industries are omitted by McGraw-Hill, the two measures can be considered in substantial agreement here.
Apparently most of the error that has accumulated in recent years in the FRB index is concentrated in the advanced processing industries. As the price controls constrained the rise in finished goods prices. The combination of increases in materials costs and the end of Phase II price controls are the main causes of the 1973 price explosion. Any additional contribution to the inflation from the relatively high operating rates in manufacturing was minor.
Conclusions
Each of the four available measures of operating rates in manufacturing -compiled by the Federal Reserve Board, by McGraw-Hill from its utilization and capacity surveys, and by the Wharton School-exhibits different characteristics. Some of the measures appear to be in substantial error in their picture of available industrial capacity in 1973. The FRB index was designed to combine information from capital stock data with information from the McGraw-Hill capacity survey to estimate year-to-year changes in capacity, with the estimation benchmarked to evidence on capacity growth from the McGraw-Hill utilization survey. But the index has wandered away from its benchmark to the utilization survey in recent years and understates current operating rates in manufacturing. The error is concentrated in the advanced processing industries portion of the index where, by the middle of 1973, the FRB operating rate of 80 percent was some 10 percent too low. To get the index back on track, the link between the two estimates of year-to-year changes and the benchmark series should be redesigned so that the index is brought nearer its current benchmark and is not allowed to wander away again.
The other three measures of capacity and utilization are available at a more disaggregated level and have been analyzed for their ability to help the economic forecaster. All three indexes prove useful in measuring the effect of utilization rates on inflation and on business investment spending, two important concerns of the forecaster. But they differ in other characteristics and are not equally reliable for comparing utilization rates in separate business cycles.
The Wharton index provides the most thorough industry detail of the three. It is constructed, basically, by defining cyclical peaks in output as an industry's capacity and connecting successive peaks to establish the growth path of capacity for each industry. This simplicity of construction is Wharton's great advantage and the methodology has been used to create utiliza-tion measures for industries outside manufacturing in the United States and for industries in other industrialized nations around the world. Its major drawback is its inability to distinguish any difference in the intensity of utilization at different peaks in an industry's output. This makes the index of little value for comparing utilization rates from one business cycle to the next. In addition, the Wharton index suffers from the disadvantage that before a new peak is established during an expansion period, its estimates of utilization are preliminary.
The McGraw-Hill capacity survey displays substantial time trends in its implied measure of operating rates. These arise because any bias in the annual estimate of capacity growth as measured by the survey accumulates through time. In addition, respondents to the capacity survey seem to have failed to detect the slowdown in capacity growth that other evidence suggests has occurred in recent years.
The McGraw-Hill utilization survey turns out to have a cyclical bias such that capacity growth is overstated, and the rise in operating rates understated, in periods when output grows rapidly, with the reverse being true in periods of slow output growth. Respondents to the survey apparently "find" capacity when output grows rapidly, and "lose" it when output growth slows. Such a bias in a survey can be adjusted for; and even without adjustment, the utilization survey is useful for comparing utilization rates at successive business cycle peaks or at other roughly comparable stages of successive business expansions and contractions. Thus it is the most useful measure for comparing 1973 operating rates with previous periods of rapid business expansion.
TODAY'S ECONOMY
Capacity in manufacturing has grown slowly in recent years-at only a 2.8 percent annual rate since 1969, according to the McGraw-Hill utilization survey. As a result, operating rates today are substantially higher than one might have expected in view of the modest growth rate in industrial output over this period. However, output was pushing against capacity limits in only a few industries during 1973. What supply problems have appeared have arisen from shortages in raw materials and from isolated rather than widespread shortages in industrial capacity.
Similarly, an explanation of the rapid run-up in industrial wholesale prices that has occurred during 1973 should be sought not in a widespread shortage of manufacturing capacity but in the end of Phase II price controls coupled with the spectacular rise in raw materials prices, which climbed rapidly throughout 1972 and accelerated to a 36 percent annual rate of increase in the first half of 1973. Throughout 1973, average operating rates in manufacturing were still substantially below those of 1966. And despite high operating rates in a few industries, capacity shortages can account for only a very minor part of the price explosion that has occurred.
